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Chapter 1
Edmund Husserl: Transcending Ideology

Copyright © 2012. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

Molly Brigid Flynn, Assumption College
Husserl was a German mathematician-turned-philosopher, born in Moravia—now part of the
Czech Republic, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—into a Jewish household. His
breakthrough work, The Logical Investigations of 1900–1901, started the phenomenological
movement, which tremendously influenced European thought in the twentieth century and which
continues today in Europe, America, and beyond.
After reading the New Testament, Husserl converted as a young man to a rather nondoctrinal Christianity. He was a patriotic German and lost a son in World War I. He was
known for living a stoical, respectable, and even bourgeois life at home and in universities:
writing, lecturing, and talking. In 1933, his son Gerhard, a philosopher of law, lost his job at
the same time that the emeritus Husserl was denied privileges at his university, because of their
Jewish ethnicity. His most famous student and his successor in the chair at the University of
Freiburg became Rector there and was just one of many National Socialists called upon to
enforce such ordinances. In 1938 Husserl died naturally before he might have died violently—
as Edith Stein, another of his students, did at Auschwitz in 1942. In 1939, his wife and his
incredible mass of papers were smuggled safely to Belgium.
After the Logical Investigations, Husserl published several more, and indeed better,
books and essays and lectures, treating philosophically, e.g., logic, perception, our experience
of other people, knowledge, time, human rational and spiritual life, and the “lifeworld” of
straightforward human experience. He was a committed critic of the irrationalism of radical
subjectivistic skepticisms, historicism, psychologism, and any theory that attempts to convince
human persons that they are incapable of reason and knowledge. For Husserl, the human mind
finds its fulfillment in truth, insight, evidence; that is, authentic thought is knowledge of true
being. Still, Husserl avoids a naïve rationalism, identifying this fulfillment as an infinite task,
with relative and temporary victories. While a defender of the human ability to know and of
philosophy as a science, he also saw clearly that absolute knowledge is only approached by
humans and that philosophy is always re-beginning.
He wrote much more than he published. His posthumously published works, lectures,
letters, and personal research manuscripts show that he had a philosophical breadth and a
keenness for detail and deep problems that belong to but a handful of philosophers in history.
There is practically no philosophical theme—from essences to cultural ontology to ethics—
that he did not write about rather intensely. Except, perhaps, for political life.
He was not a political philosopher. He was an apolitical philosopher. Still, I think,
Husserl’s apolitical philosophy has some deep, if indirect, political implications.
The marching banner for phenomenologists has been “To the things themselves!” and
phenomenologists feel most at home describing objects as they show up to us. Husserl’s

philosophy attempts to recover the objectivity of reality without succumbing to a crude
objectivism. It recognizes that the objects we experience have essences that structure how we
can experience them, and it is as interested in the subjective life in which we experience things
as it is in the things experienced. Phenomenology resists the objectification of persons, rational
subjects who experience and know the world, into mere things; at the same time, it resists the
anti-realism that would deny either the objectivity of worldly things or the special and distinct
type of “transcendental” being that each human person has.
This unjustly cursory summary of the man’s life and conclusions must suffice as an
introduction to this chapter and an invitation to the reader for a closer look. This essay offers
an Husserlian account of ideology and suggests, with some appeal to “the things themselves”
(the facts of his life), how Husserl the teacher succeeded and perhaps failed in an time of
ideological illusions and tragedies.

Husserl’s Apolitical Philosophy
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Transcendental philosophy, a very useless art, does not aid the lords and masters of this world, the politicians,
engineers, industrialists.1

Husserl wrote to his son Gerhard (July 5, 1935) that his philosophy is “wholly unpolitical.”2
Except for a few scattered remarks, he is at his most political when he speaks between the
World Wars about the cultural “crisis” and growing irrationalism of European life. The crisis,
that is, was in his lights not primarily political. The obvious, terrifying, and tragic political
events of this period of European history seem to have appeared to him as symptoms of a
deeper disease of spirit and values: a disorder in our beliefs about reason, personhood, and
truth. Namely, he believed that human beings as rational animals live under absolute norms of
truth. To be genuinely human persons, to live up to our personhood, we must seek to live up to
truth, where truth is not just theoretical but also evaluative and practical—it is a matter of how
and what we think, but also of how and what we feel, value, and do. The crisis of values he
identified and fought against in his later years arose, he thought, from a terrible rejection of
reason. A narrow rationalism, identified usually with Enlightenment thought, is one form of
this: “The European crisis has its roots in a misguided rationalism.”3 This rationalism had
symptoms (e.g., naturalism, consumerism, a rebirth of egoistic nationalism, Nazism) in other
cultural and political phenomena, which should be seen, at least partly, as misguided responses
to or fallouts of this rejection of reason’s central role in human life.
He thought that, to address this deeper crisis, what European life needed most was a
rediscovery of reason in its properly broad and rich sense. And this was the task especially of
philosophy and the philosophy of the other sciences. Husserl therefore emphasized (in a way
many of his readers find embarrassing) the beginnings of philosophy in ancient Greece; the
telos of European culture as the development of this love of truth with its concern for selfcritique and evidence; the need for Europe to rededicate itself to this idea; and our vocation to
share it with the rest of humanity. He feared that our response to the failure of modern
rationalism would be a “fall into hostility toward spirit and into barbarity,” but he hoped that
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we might instead overcome what a narrow rationalism has led us into, namely, a reductive,
naïve objectivism, with its cynical dismissal of ethical and rational norms: the choice was
between “the downfall of Europe in its estrangement from its own rational sense of life” and
“the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy.”4
In speaking of this crisis, Husserl urged a return to the Greek spirit, especially in its
rejection of sophistry. He paints Socrates as defending the ethical life against the sophists who
had, “through their subjectivism, confused and corrupted general moral convictions.”5 Socrates
did not just defend the presophistic status quo, of course, but responded to sophistry by trying
to raise humanity to a new level, insisting on the need for human beings to live out a radical,
self-critiquing search for justification and insight in ethical life. Husserl paints Plato as further
defending this radical Socratic dedication to ethical truth and self-responsibility by responding
to the sophistic “anti-scientific skepticism”; namely, Plato did this by developing philosophy
as a science, as theoretical knowledge, and by developing an understanding of how “the
communal life” or “man writ large” defends “the rational individual life.”6 In these ways,
philosophy becomes in some sense the foundation for a reasonable and genuinely human life,
individually and communally.7
When concluding the 1910 “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,” after refuting the
skeptical pseudoscientific reductions of reason by naturalism, psychologism, and historicism,
Husserl turns to discuss worldviews and philosophy. He rejects what we might call
worldviewism, the claim linked especially to historicism that one’s reason is determined by
one’s or the epoch’s view of the world. But he does not deny that worldview is something
influential over the way we think, and even a positive something, since in its best sense it is
wise. He then discusses worldview philosophy, which is the attempt by thinkers to give a
worldview grand theoretical clarity and depth. We need wisdom in the world, good practical
judgment shaped by experience and informed by a sense of the puzzles of human life and the
cosmos. The attempts to deepen and make consistent such thought are worthwhile.
Here Husserl recognizes a service played by such thought, he just denies that it is
philosophy in the proper, scientific sense. He implies that, though such thought may be more
urgent, it is “from certain points of view” less important than true philosophy.8 To try to turn
worldview reflection into philosophy in his radical and proper sense is to give in to our age’s
“fanaticism” about science, and would manage only to sacrifice real philosophizing for a
proliferation of worldview-filled wise men.9 Here belongs Husserl’s comment to his student
Aron Gurwitsch: “There are philosophers aplenty. Someone must do the dirty work—that is me
and you.”10 Worldview philosophy must take positions without radical ground, whereas
philosophy must work slowly, from the ground up, seeking truth with justification and
understanding. “For the sake of time, we must not sacrifice eternity.”11 Even those thinkers who
have given history its highest worldviews, he comments, did so because they were aiming for
philosophy as knowledge.
In 1919, an admiring and critical young thinker, Arnold Metzger, who later became his
personal assistant, wrote to Husserl and included several writings, including Phänomenologie
der Revolution, which was a “critique of philosophies which become ideologies defending a
bankrupt social order” and a “quest for genuine ideals of humanity which can serve as a basis

for social rebirth.”12 Husserl responded in a long letter urging the young man to study with him.
He encouraged Metzger while deeply and sharply disagreeing with him: “I cannot help
doubting and even definitely rejecting much of what you say.”13 Husserl praised Metzger’s
idealism and “ethical maximalism,” his desire to renew mankind by reminding it of true ideals,
and his “critical examination” of Marxism, naturalism, positivism, and any other attempt to rob
human life of worthy ideals, but Husserl also marks some deep disagreements.14
In addition to trying to correct Metzger’s interpretation of his transcendental turn, Husserl
insisted on a kind of practical difference between them. Husserl was clearly moved by the
young man’s dedication to ideals and to the imperative of improving culture and politics. In
fact, in the letter Husserl identifies the point of his whole life and philosophy as, in a sense,
serving this improvement of humanity, and he denies that scientific truth is the fulfillment of
human life. Still, Husserl backs off of politics and of any direct political use of philosophy. He
says, contrasting Metzger to himself, “you are a man of action by vocation and preference.”
Though driven by the same radical ethical and philosophical concerns as Husserl, Metzger’s
theoretically informed political striving needs more, and better, philosophy first: “then comes
the demanding task already attributed to you, the study of human realities and their
philosophical guidance.”
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This is not my task; I am not called to lead humanity in striving for happy life. I had to acknowledge this in the sorrowful
course of my war years: my daimonion warned me. I live consciously and by choice purely as a scientific philosopher (I
have written no books concerning the war, since I regarded that as a pretentious philosophical ostentation). Not that I
consider truth and science the highest values. Quite the contrary, “Intellect is the servant of the will,” and so also I am
the servant of those who shape our practical life, of the leaders of humanity.—Naturally, you will not want to accept this
apportioning of functions as valid. You are young, and full of the overflowing consciousness of your strength; you still
believe that you can and must attempt both functions. But as long as God preserves you in the Socratic dedication and in
the radicalism of truthful life, your daimonion will speak to you at the right time.15

Husserl then adds a warning, because genuine philosophy is harder than it seems.
The will is subject to the norms of truth, namely, the true good, and seeking truth in its
fullness is an ethical task, but Husserl suggests here that scientific truth is not sufficient for
good practical decisions, and that the scientific life should not be confused with the active life
of political leadership.
In his 1923-24 articles for the Japanese journal Kaizo, Husserl expresses the need for a
reorientation of culture and values. He makes two points in the first of these articles,
“Renewal: Its Problem and Method,” key to understanding his approach to philosophy,
politics, and ideology.
First, he distinguishes between the type of rationalization of the universe done by the
natural sciences, which explain by appealing to causes, and the rationalization to be done with
the help of the spiritual sciences, which can explain by pointing toward norms according to
which humans as free and rational animals should motivate themselves. Because human thought
is subject to norms, and not merely the play thing of (psychological, economic, political,
historical, etc.) forces, the human sciences must not ape the natural sciences in methods or
aims. Real cultural renewal, a movement toward a more genuinely human life, requires
scientific philosophy of the human person, community, and reason.

Scientific philosophy must help us understand the essential structures of human life and
the world, but it must also articulate the normative ideals of reason, and in this way lead
humanity toward a higher life. Though sometimes Husserl is too naïve in his statement of this
kingly role of philosophers, we should perhaps understand his vision as something like this:
natural scientists seem to be in our time admired as the paradigm of reason and as the
articulators of the ideals of the rational life, and Husserl believes this role should be filled by
those who are dedicated to reason in its radicalness, breadth, and normative power—
philosophers. As he says later, the “prosperity” of positive sciences has blinded us and has
“meant an indifferent turning-away from the questions which are decisive for a genuine
humanity. Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.”16 Husserl’s is
simultaneously a call to culture at large to reorient itself toward a fuller sense of reason and
also a call to philosophers to do so, and thereby to serve culture, not by doing something other
than philosophy, but precisely by being better philosophers.17
Though the first point from the “Renewal” essay worth emphasis here is that scientific
philosophy is needed in order to move toward a truly human, reasonable life, individually and
communally, the second is that scientific philosophy is limited in its ability to help us live in
practical reason. Though at other times he seems to overstate the effectiveness of a
philosophical renewal for a cultural renewal, here Husserl clearly indicates that a proper
philosophy is needed, but not enough. Whereas “the merely empirical sciences of man…cannot
offer us what we need in our striving for renewal,” the proper “helper” of this renewal is an
actual understanding of what human spirituality—in its individual, social, political, and
cultural dimensions—essentially is, can be, and should seek to be.18 A scientific philosophy of
human life provides “preparatory theoretical work” for the reasonable renewal of culture.19
And again, reflecting on the failure of philosophy so far to provide an understanding of the
essential structures and norms of human life, Husserl asks,
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What should we do? Should we again proceed, as in political matters when, for instance, as citizens we prepare to vote?
Are we supposed to judge only according to instinct and inclination, according to assumption we tend to overlook?
Actions like these may be perfectly justified if the day comes on which such a decision is required, and with it the action
is completed. But in our case there is a concern for a temporal infinity and for the eternal in the temporal—the future of
mankind, the genesis of a true humanity—for which we still feel ourselves responsible.20

The task of the philosopher is in certain respects more important but less urgent in
addressing the cultural crisis. It is more kingly, but less forceful. It reaches in more deeply but
cuts less directly than politics. It invests for centuries, but does not solve the pressing practical
problems of today and tomorrow.
Some have accused Husserl of presenting an ultimately anarchist political philosophy,
because when he describes the ideal human community—the “genuine humanity” for which his
philosophy feels responsible—it is not a political community. The question remains21 how
various types of political community could help or hinder the development toward such a
perfect “community of love,” an ideal and infinitely distant, multi- and super-national human
life. Still, this ideal is in itself not political. That is just to say, for Husserl, human being would
find its highest earthly culmination in a truly ethical, reasonable, and love-infused personal and
communally shared life; government is not the point or the fulfillment, but a servant of this life,
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and how it can serve this life seems to be mostly a matter of prudence. This prudence can and
should be informed by scientific philosophy’s elucidation of the essential structures of human
life and community, and should be inspired by the norms of reason and ethics that philosophy
can help articulate. Still, he implies, philosophy seems neither called nor able to supplant this
prudence, the wisdom needed to serve human fulfillment politically in the human space that
must remain under of this ideal.
Husserl did not confront political ideologies directly. This came partly from a decision to
protect what was most important in his work. This seems to me a wise tactical move.
Philosophies are too often either expropriated or attacked by political movements. The best
political thought to come out of his students has partly arisen from the conviction that there is a
reality to human beings deeper than politics and a calling of human beings far beyond politics.
Zdzisław Krasnodębski comments, for example, that it was the very apolitical nature of
phenomenology that attracted philosophers behind the Iron Curtain to it, since in a totalitarian
situation being unpolitical is a most powerful and subversive political statement.22 Naturally—
but ironically, from the point of view of politics—this conviction seems necessary for a decent
politics. Politics has nothing to serve apart from itself unless we preserve and honor
nonpolitical human goods. In philosophy it is a mistake and in practical politics it is a
mishandling of our situation to make too much of politics.
The “apportioning of functions” Husserl wrote about to Metzger seems to follow from an
important insight, an insight that gives political reason an incomplete but real independence
from the philosophical task of securing scientific knowledge about essential structures of
human life, valid but far off ideals, and universal a priori truths. It is an insight that respects
non-philosophical knowledge and authority. It therefore protects the world of human living
from experts with a “scientific” theory, aping the natural sciences, about how the human world
“really” works.
Husserl’s most important insight in political philosophy seems to be a distinction between
politics and philosophy. This seems to me a crucial point. It is not an error from within
chemistry to think that chemistry can solve all human problems. It is not the effect of a
psychological defect that some psychologists think that human beliefs are all explained
psychologically. These are philosophical errors. It is a political mistake, in addition to a
philosophical error, terrible and too common, to elevate politics to the point of life or political
thought to the highest human knowledge, to think that politics can solve all human problems or
that our beliefs are all determined politically. It does not complete a political philosophy, but it
is a good start, to distinguish between politics and philosophy. Likewise, it is a philosophical
mistake to presume philosophy replaces rather than elucidates, elevates, and protects nonphilosophical life. Though we should wish that this great thinker reflected more on the
structures of political life, we should be grateful for what he has left us and thankful that he at
least did not make these mistakes.

Ideologism
And what of the rationality of that irrationalism which is so much vaunted and expected of us? Does it not have
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to convince us, if we are expected to listen to it, with rational considerations and reasons? Is its irrationality not
finally rather a narrow-minded and bad rationality? 23

In “Science as a Vocation,” Max Weber argues that values should be left out of a teacher’s
lessons. The student turns to the teacher not as a partisan prophet, a worldview preacher, or a
lifecoach, but to teach what is known about some subject. It is wrong to transform the lectern
into a pulpit or platform.
Science is a matter of facts, known truths, whereas values for Weber are not a matter of
reason—or of unreason. They are not knowable, but result from personal decision, from one’s
ultimate position to life. To disagree with Weber, one must disagree somehow with the way he
characterizes facts and values. It is a naïve distinction, and the cynical rejection of it claims
that the facts are as much up for grabs and in need of a personal decision as values. If we think
following Weber, but reject his distinction in this cynical way, then what he fears most comes
to pass more than ever. Facts would be putty in the hands of a worldview, and teachers would
not be able to be anything other than prophets or activists.
In short, the particular danger to teaching and learning that I wish to discuss with
Husserl’s help is ideologism. This is its danger: it transforms teaching and learning from a
truth-approaching activity to a prejudice-, preference-, and worldview-infecting process.
Ideologism is the claim that all people have an ideology: all people are adherents of some
system of fundamental beliefs that (1) determines their other beliefs, in the sense that it (2) is
the interpretive framework by which they understand any thing or state of affairs, and thus that
(3) is not susceptible of evidence (because it is the interpretive framework for all possible
evidence).
Grand ideologies are no longer stylish, but ideologism is quite popular. Its presence in a
student’s mind blocks true learning, and because it gives a prose-cutorial immunity to any
person’s ideology of choice, it invites a teacher to become an agitator.
In order to recover teaching and learning as truth-relevant activities, we must destroy this
ism of isms. Husserl’s “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” is directed at various doctrines
(naturalism, psychologism, historicism, worldviewism) that reject the person’s ability to get to
truth, so we start there.
Husserl attacks intellectual ideologies, always in defense of the ability of mind to
transcend itself. Psychologism claims that beliefs are caught in a system of causally
determining psychological laws. Naturalism claims that all things—including beliefs and
values—are nature in the sense asserted by modern natural science, quantified matter governed
by exact laws. Historicism claims that beliefs are produced by historical milieu. This pattern
appears in many varieties. Also common is the sociologistic version, claiming that beliefs are
determined by social or socioeconomic status. There is also a sexist version, a genderist
version, a racist version, a psychoanalytic version, and so on. The common factor is the
assignment of causes where reasons are supposed to be capable of operating. For some reason,
since Husserl’s time until now, these anti-intellectual ideologies have been très chic among
intellectuals.
Husserl’s disproof of such skeptical claims is to show that they are self-defeating,
“counter-sense.” In each case, the belief asserting the causal claim that all beliefs are caused
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by such and such should also be caused by such and such, in which case the assertion must lack
reasons. Husserl likes to remind us here of basic logic rules. Such truths would not afford our
insight (and we could not think at all) if all beliefs were determined as dominos in some
pattern of events. A “radical subjective skepticism” about logic is absurd because it denies to
logical principles their role as ideals presiding over thought, and even (often enough,
especially) the people attempting to deny them appeal to ideals of reason, and must.
In urging others to render tribute to whatever reduction you fancy, you must pay them in
reasons, but any appeal you make to principles for consistent thinking robs your conclusion of
its currency and meaning. To argue for the despotism of force over thought, one must pay
homage to the sovereignty of reason and the liberty of the mind.
Any reason-giving for these claims begs the question against such claims that mind is not
open to reasons. The man who asserts, in communication, such a proposition is performing the
intellectual version of mutually assured destruction, though he doesn’t know it.
But equally, any reason-giving against these claims begs the question. The best we can do
to disprove such a claim is point out to ourselves and to anyone else around that this man’s
position (proposition) destroys his own position (ground) as truth-claimer and reason-giver.
We then want to appreciate—and I mean, not just notice, but also wonder at and be thankful
for—the fact that mind is open to evidence.
These isms have a common factor—the claim that ideas are not ideas but something else.
Husserl’s accusation of self-refutation against them is decisive, but a negative and not a
positive victory. His entire philosophical career, the key moves he makes in establishing the
phenomenological movement, is the positive response, because it elucidates the openness of
the mind to the world and thereby helps us see the absurdity in denying that the mind is the
mind, and not something else.
Husserl makes several basic moves that help us reopen the space of reason in an age of
cynical skepticism:
(a) By its nature, the mind is essentially open and receptive to other things. This is his
celebrated doctrine of intentionality, a small thing with deep implications. We are not aware
merely of our own creations, our images or concepts. We are aware of things other than
ourselves.
(b) He urges us to return to the things themselves for their truths. Against systems of a
priori hypothesizing, against “top down” thinking that imagines it can tell us how things must
be in abstraction from our encounters with them, Husserl insists that thought finds its telos and
becomes authentic in the insightful presence of the objects about which we think.
(c) He reasserts the rights of the world of human experience. Because, even prephilosophically, mind encounters things, he defends the everyday reason operative in
pretheoretical life. The mind’s encounter with the world is not invented by philosophy.
Intentionality, mind’s openness to and interest in the things themselves, didn’t go comatose in
the modern era, even though many philosophers stopped believing in it. This is the major
reason moderns discount the commonly assumed world and the reason operative in it. In
contrast, Husserl insists that, while episteme [science] is higher than doxa [opinion], the higher
levels build on and cannot replace the lower level.

Teaching is supposed to be a guiding of students to learn, and learning means gaining and
deepening one’s understanding of the world, oneself, and beyond. What are the conditions of
the possibility of authentic teaching? That there is a truth about things and that we can
encounter things in their truth. That the realm of things themselves shows up to us, teachers and
students, in common, so that we can talk about it. That the student doesn’t start from nowhere,
but starts with prior, valid though less perfect, contact with the truth of things.
Husserl is a teacher who leads us to see that these theses are not ungrounded, merely
hopeful hypotheses. They follow from the nature of our situation—that we find ourselves
together, minded, and in the world.

An Husserlian Contribution to Political Philosophy: Naturalism and other
Ideologies

Copyright © 2012. Lexington Books. All rights reserved.

“We must also allow relative evidences. Otherwise we dissolve life.”24

Husserl also teaches us how to understand those systems of assertions that would deny our
situation. One of his most important, and original, analyses is of the naturalistic attitude. I shall
argue that this analysis should be extended by analogy to help us understand ideology
generally. About naturalism, he makes two main claims:
(1) Everyday prephilosophical intentionality (Husserl’s “natural” attitude or
“personalistic” attitude) does its job too well, though of course fallibly: it sees the world, but
it is invisible to itself, it lacks self-knowledge. The naturalistic attitude attempts to abstract
from all subject-relative characteristics of the world—for example, values, culture,
prejudices, sensations. In an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of common human
subjectivity, it digs in deeper on self-forgetfulness. It is hyperaware of how the activities of
consciousness skew others’ beliefs, but it is more thoroughly unaware of its own fallibility
because it pretends to have escaped subjectivity. The naturalistic attitude may acquire an
expansionist disdain for everyday experience and dismiss its accomplishments. When it does
so, it claims to uncover the “true” world beneath the world of experience, and to dismiss as
false subjective construction the world as experienced and understood by common human
sensibility, thought, and culture.
(2) The naturalistic attitude operates on the assumption that physical things are ideally
mathematical and perfectly determined by laws we can formalize mathematically. We never in
fact come across ideally flat planes, perfect spheres, or falling objects immune to incidental
friction. In fact we know that concrete things cannot fulfill these geometrical ideals. But
Galileo’s theories about freefalling objects speak as though the boards and balls of his
experiment instantiate this ideal realm and obey perfectly laws formulated in its terms.
In sum, the naturalistic attitude involves us in two abstractions: it abstracts away the
human involvement in the world and abstracts away the non-ideal concreteness and
irregularities of things. Theorists adopting the naturalistic attitude commit the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness, and undermine their own ground, if they assert that this method
captures wholly the one true world and provides an etiology of the merely subjective
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experiences of prescientific life.
When these abstractions are applied to ideas and the life of reason, theorizing persons
taking up the naturalistic attitude cut off their legs—or, more aptly, close up their eyes and ears
and minds: since the naturalistic attitude abstracts from human meaning and subjective
experience, it cannot make sense of these as what they are. It is by making this reifying, selfreferential move of trying to causally explain acts of reason, which must after all include
scientific theorizing, that natural science warps itself into a self-refuting naturalistic
dogmatism. It is the reification of mind and its ideas and laws that results in the ideological
character of naturalism and of other ideologies.
Naturalism is the ideological evil twin of natural science, and is only one example.
Ideology is usually about more properly human things: about politics, culture, religion,
morality, etc. But other ideologies approach these phenomena with analogous dual
abstractions. (1) Ideology dismisses pre-theoretical ideas about how the human world works.
It tries to explain the human things of ethics and politics in formulas, imagining that it has
discovered a telescope that sees around, and no longer through, normal human eyes. (2)
Ideology speaks as though people fulfilled a theoretical ideal. Not only are we pushed into
being merely instances of an ideal type governed by simplified laws, so that our irregularities
are smoothed away to fit into the theory, but also usually ideologies abstract away some
particular necessary feature of human nature (for example, that we must know and care about
certain people more than others, or that not all goods can be measured monetarily, or that
persons bear responsibility for their actions and products despite the social structures they find
themselves within).
I suggest these are the essential features of ideology. That ideologues are closed to
counter-evidence is the first property flowing from this essence. Someone in the grip of an
ideology cannot appreciate and weigh evidence contrary to their overall theory because they
start by rejecting the validity of normal evidence and believe their fundamental theory about
what is “really” going on morally or politically explains the origin of the appearances, the
false consciousness, of those who do not accept their system.
This is analogous to the way a conspiracy theory works. A conspiracy theory involves
two allegations: the primary crime and the cover-up. A conspiracy theory becomes a closed
system, not open to public reason and disproof, when any evidence that does not support the
primary accusation is taken to support the cover-up allegation. This creates an unchallengeable
interpretive framework. Ideologies can work as complete explanations and closed
interpretative frameworks only because they discount the evidence offered in common to
human beings. In order to permanently and rationally trump the conflicting, imperfect, and
unclear opinions that dominate the human realm, ideologies begin by discounting the concrete
world of pre-theoretical life.
It is not just coincidence that ideologies share this structure with naturalism of rejecting
the obvious, experienced world and constructing a new and neater one. Ideologies take on this
structure because they ape naturalism. This seems to be because the natural sciences provide in
our culture the model of how to theorize. And like naturalism, ideologies generally must start
with the notion that the real world is not the one available to common human opinion and with
the correlate notion that human opinion too must be explained by this real world that their
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story maps by identifying its basic objects and laws. It is fundamental to naturalism and to
other ideologies to deny that our basic experiences are truthful, however inadequate, and to
claim, instead, that they are things, causes and effects, explainable like things. But the real
world they map is in truth a theoretically constructed world, and it must be an absurd one to the
extent that they deny that pre-theoretical evidence grounds and can correct the account. After
all, if the real world were not given, however imperfectly, in basic human experience, no
amount of our theorizing could get us there. And if the mind and its reasoning were drained of
their veracity and unmasked as merely thingly effects of something else, as this type of
theorizing presumes, no amount of reason-giving and evidence-finding could move us toward
the truth.
Ideology originally was to be the “scientific” psychological explanation of human ideas.
Ideologies, in the pejorative contemporary sense, always involve a moment of the
pseudoscientific reification and explanation of our beliefs. They attempt to dismiss normal
human experience, to deprive it of its validity, in order to put some idealized system in its
place. The response to ideology must be a true study of ideas, one that lets ideas be ideas
rather than turning them into things to be explained away and controlled.
Aurel Kolnai writes that Husserl’s Experience and Judgment “propounds a grandiose
vista of absolute anti-Cartesianism: the discovery, as original as it is epoch-making, but
Aristotelian in spirit, that our valid and strict ‘scientific’ or ‘philosophical’ knowledge
proceeds, not from a ‘minimum’ knowledge of certain and evident truth, but from our inexplicit
world knowledge in all its wealth, manifoldness and implication of order.”25 Husserl often
says that philosophy must be a presuppositionless science and that it, as first philosophy,
provides foundations for the rest of human knowledge, everyday as well as scientific. But, as
Kolnai saw clearly, phenomenology fulfills this Cartesian-sounding mission in an unCartesian
way. It provides a foundation for knowledge by reflecting upon and understanding it, such that
it can defend this nonphilosophical knowledge while also deepening and elevating it. And this
is true of empirical as well as moral and practical knowledge. This is why Husserl can present
his philosophy as reasserting the rights of doxa, opinion. “Essentially the path of knowledge is
to ascend from doxa to epistēmē—it is simply that even concerning this ultimate goal, the
origin and specific rights of the lower stages should not be forgotten.”26
Kolnai points especially to sections seven to ten of Experience and Judgment.27 While
not giving up on the claim that episteme really does go beyond everyday doxa, Husserl insists
that knowledge builds upon it and cannot therefore reject the realm of opinion. Naturalism and
scientistic human sciences seem to claim that they discover the true, exact, and causally
explained world behind the merely false show of the subjectively distorted realm that naïve
humans live in. Husserl argues that they substitute a creation of their minds for the true world.
As an unavoidable fact, science is accomplished by scientists, and scientists are people, too:
the conclusions of scientists need to build upon rather than reject this world that appears to
humans in common, and scientists must return to this realm to verify and give meaning to their
conclusions. Particular ideologies, I suggest, have a parallel form to naturalism: they do not
claim merely to discover true features of the world, but they claim to discover the true world
according to which our appearances prior to their theory are false, and to explain how these
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appearances themselves are generated by the unapparent world they purport to know.
Ideologism is unlike other ideologies in an important respect. It is motivated by the
multiplicity of such theories asserting a hidden real world, and in response it asserts a
subjectivistic skepticism—according to their theory, we are all caught in such systems of false
appearances. Thus ideologism seems to suggest, unlike other ideologies, that there is no true
world either hidden but scientifically knowable or available in common. There is just a
multiplicity of opinions. But by calling the variety of ideologies the ultimate reality, which
ideology-studies can uncover, ideologism takes on the shape of other ideologies. Since
theorists committed to ideologism claim that by adopting an ideology a person’s other opinions
are determined, they in their study of ideologies provide a dehumanizing explanation of
people’s appearances, beliefs, and reasonings—just as other ideologies claim to do.
The defenders of ideologism sometimes argue for this theory by observing that human
observations are never of raw data. We never experience a pristinely objective intuition of the
facts. When we see something we interpret the data with the help of pre-established opinions
and concepts. Thus, as I have been told, for example, what one see as a tree, another may see
as a nymph; what you see as an act of kindness, I may see as a passive-aggressive attempt to
keep me subjugated. The move that Kolnai represents as anti-Cartesian brilliance in
Experience and Judgment might be taken as evidence of this claim. Husserl emphasizes that
our basic experience of things in the world, the experience upon which the sciences build,
involves never pure and clear, self-evident data, but givens that we accept from an “external
horizon” of the assumed world, a horizon by which we anticipate things to be a certain way,
more or less of a certain type and style. And every particular thing also has, according to
Husserl’s analysis of perception, an “internal horizon,” a set of expectations on our part that
the given object has certain features we do not yet directly encounter. Given these rich and
unarticulated assumptions, every given is interpreted by us, and not just experienced selfevidently.
Husserl’s analysis of our perceptions allows us to admit that subjective history and belief
color our experiences. Still, we should not conclude with a subjectivistic skepticism, since as
Husserl’s analysis also shows, the world and its objects are still given and with their own
integrity. Even when some person sees a tree as potential lumber and another sees it as the
body of a tree spirit, there is still a basic encounter with reality they share. The world of our
past experience is the source of these anticipations, and often enough what the world gives us
fails to fulfill our expectations. We experience such failures, too. The world is not putty in the
hands of our assumptions.
Husserl argues in “The Origin of Geometry” that geometry comes from taking the shaped
things of our concrete surrounding world and imaginatively pushing them toward ideal “limit
shapes.” Geometry then progresses as a tradition, taught by one generation to the next and
added to. The “developed capacity” to recognize the ground of geometry in our surrounding
world is not passed on in geometry textbooks. This ground may even be forgotten, although it
can always be retraced. Authentic thinking about abstract objects requires the “actually
developed capacity for reactivating the primal beginnings” of our abstractions, recognizing
how they are built intellectually out of materials from the experienced world.28 This capacity
must be personally developed and cannot be handed over in a formula—but it can be

apprenticed.
Ideologies not only forget but deny their origins. They cut off the branch they are sitting
on. They poison the spring we all drink from. They refuse our right to return to the true world
to insightfully cash in their propositions. To respond to ideologies, we need this “developed
capacity” for concreteness.
Ideologism alleges that we are all ideologues. It is the bad faith tu quoque response of
those who want a free pass to profess their worldview. Ideologism unmasks naturalism as just
another ideology, and unmasks the facts as just as arbitrary as values and everything else
naturalism tells us belongs to the merely subjective false show that is the human world. But this
whole style of thinking is a mistake.
In fact, neither worldviews nor human values float free. Even the worst are ultimately
rooted in and are about the world we view and our life in it.
People too often turn away from aspects of the world that do not fit their system, and—as
Weber says—a good teacher reminds students of “inconvenient facts” that do not flatter their
party opinions.29 Husserl shows us a truth that is inconvenient for ideologists: human persons
cannot avoid the question of truth and the norm of evidence, even when it comes to worldviews
and values.
Teaching in the age of abstractions requires remembering our ground, that we find
ourselves together, minded, and in the world—and then apprenticing and nurturing the capacity
for concreteness.

Husserl as Teacher
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“It is a discomforting, challenging, and troublesome philosophy that has no use for partisans and discipleship,
that above all sends everyone off on the path of one’s own reflective thought.”30

In the classroom, Husserl seems to have been an uncharismatic teacher wrapped up in his
thoughts. Many students who would become significant thinkers in their own rights attended his
classes, but the excitement that drew students to the phenomenological movement came from
the content of his thought more than from his personality. The effect it had on Jean-Paul Sartre,
though not a direct student of Husserl’s, illustrates what inspired many of his students.
Raymond Aron told Sartre, as they were Frenchly discussing philosophy over drinks, that
phenomenology allows one to philosophize about concrete human experience and about the
things of real human life—even this wine bottle. It was love at first sight.
Modern philosophy, especially neo-Kantianism, still dominated. The modern
philosophical dogma of the separation of the subject from the object, with the problem of
knowledge that results, was overcome by Husserl’s recovery of intentionality, his rejection of
psychologism, and his reaffirmation of the human connection with the world. An energizing
concreteness and realism invited students to illuminate descriptively human experience of our
world. The phenomenological groups that sprung up in German universities show how the
Logical Investigations opened the windows and rejuvenated creative minds. It is this
overcoming of modernity that prompted Kolnai, a passing student who would not call himself a
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phenomenologist, to say that Husserl was perhaps the greatest philosopher since Aristotle and
to suggest, “the future historiography of ideas…will set it down as a common place that with
Husserl commences the non-Cartesian Age in European thought.”31
Many of the early phenomenologists rejected Husserl’s later development, especially the
epoché and transcendental idealism, precisely because his recovery of realism had convinced
them so deeply. One of these early phenomenologists, Edith Stein worked with Husserl closely
as an assistant soon after this transcendental turn. In her words, “All of us had the same
question on our minds....The Logical Investigations had caused a sensation primarily because
it appeared to be a radical departure from critical idealism which had a Kantian and neoKantian stamp.…Knowledge again appeared as reception, deriving its laws from objects not,
as criticism has it, from determination which imposes laws on the objects. All the young
phenomenologists were confirmed realists. However, the Ideas included some expressions
which sounded as though the Master wished to return to idealism.”32
That many early students rejected his next big move shows, perhaps, that his lack of
charisma had pedagogic value: they were taught not cowed; they were convinced by a man’s
thoughts, not by a man. I think they misunderstood Husserl in rejecting transcendental
reflection, but the point is that these “realist phenomenologists” saw in this turn a relapse into
pre-phenomenological thinking, into the ideology of modern philosophy. Husserl rejected also
a naïve objectivism, one that refused to take subjectivity seriously, and even if modern
philosophy had emphasized subjectivity at the expense of objectivity and thus made a mess of
both, Husserl was convinced that objectivism was as real a danger as subjectivism, since both
block our understanding of the human encounter with the world. We must not make the world
into a misadventure of the subject, but neither may we make the person just another element of
the world.
Though Husserl as a teacher did not come across as terribly engaged with his students, it
was according to himself in a teaching moment that he became truly philosophical. Lev Shestov
had written several articles critical of Husserl, and in response Husserl had sent a request
ahead of his arrival at a 1928 conference in Amsterdam that Shestov stay a few days longer so
that they might meet and talk. He immediately addressed Shestov personally and generously,
“with sincerity, enthusiasm, and inspiration.”33 First he defended himself: “You have turned me
into a stone statue, raised me onto a lofty pedestal, and then with hammer-blows you have
shattered this statue to bits. But am I really so lapidary?”34 This first defense is interesting. He
resisted being turned into an inflexible and impersonal set of theories. If we approach fellow
thinkers like that we may attack them or follow them, but we may not learn from them. Husserl
encouraged his students to read the history of philosophy, but not to read it as historically done
and gone.
It is possible that he failed to always approach other thinkers the way he wished to be
approached. But this view of himself gives a clue about Husserl as a thinker and teacher.
While presenting himself as the founder a movement and a leader into a new epoch of
philosophy, he also insisted he was—and he truly was—always a beginner and a re-beginner.
He felt an intense, personal responsibility to himself, his students, and fellow thinkers to be
honest and radical in his defense of our search for knowledge.

Describing himself thirty years prior, he then said to Shestov, “To my own indescribable
horror, I convinced myself that if contemporary philosophy has said the last word about the
nature of knowledge, then we have no knowledge.”35 At this thought we should wonder, why
teach? If all we teachers do is reinforce the modern or contemporary theories of nonknowledge, of locked mind-cabinets without keyholes or worldviews without windows on the
world or ungroundable perception-permeating conceptual schemes, we are neither teaching
knowledge nor encouraging and drawing out our students so they may discover knowledge on
their own. Husserl then confessed to Shestov a personal moment of radical philosophical
motivation:
Once, when I was giving a lecture at the university, expounding ideas I had taken over from our contemporaries, I
suddenly felt like I had nothing to say, that I was standing before my students with empty hands and an empty soul. And
then I resolved both for myself and for my students to submit the existing theories of knowledge to that severe and
unrelenting criticism which has aroused the indignation of so many people.
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This moment, he reported to Shestov, was the “origin of my Logical Investigations.”36
His sense of philosophical responsibility, for himself as a thinker and as a teacher with
influence over others, gave rise to what Husserl would become as a thinker and a teacher.
Descriptions of him while teaching formally and while talking with students, which he did
often, indicate paradoxically that Husserl was both unengaged with his audience and intensely
engaging. He would often speak almost as though speaking to himself. He monologued; he did
not lead discussions or elicit participation. Even worse, his intense involvement with the
objects of his thought seemed sometimes to distract him from the presence of other people. But,
if we may flaunt current pedagogical nostrums, in doing so he still managed to teach, and
perhaps teach better for it. We can guess that two things came across, often enough engagingly
and even inspirationally: first, on the object side, that the topics of his thought are interesting,
and second, on the subject side, that we should be, like him, intensely honest philosophically,
searching for the truths of being and facing our responsibilities as thinkers. The result seems to
have been many students who wanted to get to the truth of things and who felt not only free but
obliged to disagree with “the Master.”
In 1966, Aron Gurwitsch eloquently described the effect Husserl had on him as a student:
When the author made his first acquaintance with Husserl’s philosophy about forty years ago, he was overwhelmed by
the spirit of uncompromising integrity and radical philosophical responsibility, by the total devotedness which made the
man disappear behind his work. Soon the young beginner came to realize the fruitfulness both of what Husserl had
actually accomplished and of what he had initiated, the promise of further fruitful work.…It was the style of Husserl’s
philosophizing, painstaking analytical work on concrete problems and phenomena rather than the opening up of large
vistas, that made the young student take the decision to devote his life and work to the continuation and expansion of
Husserl’s phenomenology—in a word, to remain a disciple forever, faithful to Husserl’s spirit and general orientation, but
at the same time prepared to depart from particular theories if compelled to do so by the nature of the problems and the
logic of the theoretical situation.37

Being a disciple of Husserl could not mean being a mere follower. By disappearing
behind the thought, by displaying sincerity and dedication to the truth, Husserl at his best drew
out of his students a desire to be like him in crucial virtues without impressing on his students
the desire to become another him or to act as his dummy.
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From the point of view of someone interested in research on Husserl, it is frustrating that
this thinker was so detail oriented, always working from the ground up, and repeatedly
rethinking everything, even and especially the beginnings. But of course these are some of
Husserl’s philosophical virtues. They manifest his sense of the responsibility that fallible
human thinking has to the truth of being. Toward the end of his life, he commented to a former
student, Adelgrundis Jaegerschmid, that philosophy must rededicate itself to the essential thing,
“to truth.” “The question about ultimate being, concerning truth, must be the object of every
philosophy. That is my life’s work.”38 But this dedication to philosophy as a science, as
knowledge of being and of the subjectivity that knows it, means also humility: “One must have
the courage to admit and say that something that one still considered true yesterday, but that one
sees to be an error today, is such an error. There is nothing absolute here.”39 The absolute truth
that philosophy must seek to be itself—and especially the most important truth, about the
absolute—is an infinite task, but this means philosophy is always on the way, always
incomplete and beginning again.
I think Husserl is right in this characterization of philosophy, but it requires a lot of us.
Sometimes a student is looking for the absolute truth, especially about the most pressing
practical questions of personal and communal life. When such a student meets a genius, it is
easy to hold on too tightly, to be convinced too quickly that one has happened upon and can
now possess the ultimate key that unlocks the meaning of it all. The impulse to genuine
philosophy might then collapse into enrapture by a grand worldview or neat, all-explaining
ideological system, and many who lack Husserl’s indefatigable philosophical conscience and
daunting work ethic were, and are, more satisfied with that. Though Husserl said, as quoted
above, that his life’s work was reorienting philosophy to its true telos of the truth of being, this
is why Husserl also characterizes his “task for the world,” as showing “people through
phenomenology a new modality of their responsibility in order to free them of their vanities
and their ego.”40
Husserl had his vanities, too. These included a belief that he had a mission from God to
re-found philosophy—this time in its fullness—and a desire to have a group of students who
would fulfill his work for him faithfully.
He influenced many, but his lack of continuers troubled him. Especially beginning in the
late 1920s, others, raising existential and anthropological issues more starkly, stole his thunder.
More than a few students rejected central parts of his philosophy. A few students even betrayed
him personally. (His most influential student, Martin Heidegger, in letters from the 1920s brags
of attacking his work while teaching and even of “wringing his neck,” writing in 1923 to
fellow thinkers in the phenomenological milieu about the “old man”: “He lives off his mission
as the ‘Founder of Phenomenology,’ but nobody knows what that means.”41) Though he had
many more students who were grateful to him and remained friends with him, even those
students dedicated to him personally and philosophically were too independent minded to
fulfill Husserl’s mission for him. Husserl wrote to former student Roman Ingarden in 1927, “it
often weighs heavily on my soul that others in the circle of phenomenologists do not see this
necessity” of the paths his thought had taken: “instead, they all prefer to follow their own
way.”42

While sick in the fall of 1937, in conversation with Jaegerschmid, he wished to have
succeeded in freeing himself from vanity, “including the professional vanity without which a
young person cannot work: the honor and admiration of my students.”43 Part of this fault of
Husserl’s reminds us of the natural allure of admiration. But for Husserl it was more complex.
Ingarden described the situation beautifully:
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The range of problems with which he occupied himself, problems which in their essence are entirely original and new, is
enormous. Their solution, however, if they were all to be treated with the same exactness and intuitive vision, was
undoubtedly beyond the spiritual powers of one man. But Husserl could not treat them in any other way, guided as he
was by his great sense of responsibility, and his ethical approach to his whole philosophical activity. The task to which he
devoted his life, and with the development of his personality was bound up, was—frankly speaking—impossible. No one
could really help him with it. He often spoke of a generation of “selfless” researchers, who would devote themselves
completely to the solution of the problems he had outlined. But of course that was just an illusion. Should such
researchers be really “selfless,” they would be only simulacra of men, and not human beings of flesh and blood. As such
they could never solve any of his problems. And should they be really human, it would be simply impossible for them in
the Husserlian spirit.44

In 1935, toward the end of his life and while being increasingly marginalized socially and
intellectually within Germany, and even prevented from travelling abroad to conferences
because, as ethnically Jewish, he was seen by the regime as not a proper representative of
Germany, Husserl lamented to Jaeger-schmid: “except for [Eugen] Fink, for the past four years
I have not had one student to whom I could speak my mind.…Now that I am seventy—I am
seventy-six—I have no circle of students or the possibility to lecture, I lack the school that
would want to take my thought further and publish them.”45 Still, later in conversations with
her, he seems to remember that he is not the only person with the philosophical vocation
requiring taking one’s own path, saying to Jaeger-schmid, his student and confidant: “Promise
me never to say anything just because others have said it.”46
Part vanity and part self-consolation in the face of his inability to fulfill the impossible
responsibility of a philosopher, this conceit—and its disappointment—stayed with Husserl, it
seems, till the end, or at least close to it. Jaegerschmid reports, that “from Maundy Thursday
on”—less than a fortnight before his death on April 26, 1938—“he did not speak one more
word about his philosophical work, which had occupied him throughout the previous months.
Just how much his entire life was subject to the mission of a higher power was revealed only
as he was dying. Now he felt finally discharged and released from his task.”47

Conclusions
“In the path of true science, this path is endless. Accordingly, phenomenology demands that the phenomenologist
foreswear the ideal of a philosophical system and yet as a humble worker in community with others, live for a
perennial philosophy.”48

While restoring the validity of the experienced world, Husserl rehabilitates human reason as
capable of and fulfilled in truth. His attacks on truth-obscuring dogmas can be understood as
reminding reason of its work when it has been distracted and dejected by ideologies. For many
thinkers, his call back to the things themselves was rejuvenating fresh air, opening the windows
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of the modern mind.
His claim to make philosophy a science must not be misunderstood. This science, like all
others, is accomplished by human beings, is never perfect, and must be done with the help of
others, both contemporary coworkers and those long dead. About himself, Husserl wrote, “If
he has been obliged, on practical grounds, to lower the ideal of the philosopher to that of a
downright beginner, he has at least in his old age reached for himself the complete certainty
that he should thus call himself a beginner.”49
Also struggling to become genuine beginners, those he influenced went in all directions
doing their own thing. At the end, he says, “I seek not to instruct, but to lead, to point out and
describe what I see. I claim no other right than that of speaking according to my best lights,
principally before myself but in the same manner also before others, as one who has lives in
all its seriousness the fate of a philosophical existence.”50 Yet he was disappointed that he
lacked phenomenological heirs, faithful students who might carry out the “infinite tasks” of
philosophy as he wanted. His lack of followers must not be taken as a failure. With Husserl’s
help, we can insightfully understand and reject ideologies. We then can appreciate the great
and varied work lying before our fallible reason and be thankful that good teachers are not
gurus. The quality of a teacher cannot be judged by his students’ mistakes when they have
failed to follow him faithfully, but it can be judged if his students have merely followed him
faithfully.
Though unpolitical, Husserl’s life’s work can be seen as profoundly anti-ideological. One
of his students, Jan Patočka, had another student, Czech dissident Václav Havel, who wrote
bravely of ideology: “To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home: all
one has to do is accept it, and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on new
meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxiety, and loneliness vanish. Of course,
one pays dearly for this low-rent home: the price is abdication of one’s own reason,
conscience, and responsibility.” It is most of all in defense of reason, conscience, and
responsibility that Husserl’s philosophy is animated, and we see Husserl’s reverberations in
Havel’s claim that “the human predisposition to truth” is ultimately what is at issue in our
response to ideology.51
We might conclude by pointing to Patočka’s dissident death in Prague and to Wojtyła’s
courageous crusade to build a church in Kraków as evidence that Husserl’s influence bore
heroic fruit in the struggles against ideology and totalitarianism, which must also be struggles
for the integrity of the person as reasonable, responsible, and called to live in truth. But giving
him this credit would be a stretch, and self-defeating. Honesty would then force us to debit him
for the many ideological failings of those he influenced. Instead, each thinker must take
responsibility for himself, and it is a mark of Husserl’s success as a teacher and leader that his
students and admirers went in their many own directions.
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